Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
Volume 16, Fall 2002, Issue 3

Regulating Legal Advice in Cyberspace
Catherine J. Lanctot

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

Article 3

REGULATING LEGAL ADVICE IN
CYBERSPACE
CATHERINE J. LANCTOTI

My first introduction to the complex ethical issues presented
by the Internet came in 1995, when some colleagues at Villanova

Law School asked me to participate in a continuing legal
education presentation entitled "The Internet: Hip or Hype?" At
the time, for many people, the jury was still out as to how
pervasive the Internet's effect would be. I am embarrassed to
admit that, in those early days, I was one of the skeptics about
cyberspace, openly speculating whether the Internet would be yet
another technological innovation that would soon be relegated to
the dustbins of history, like my eight-track tape player from the
Seventies.
Events have proven me wrong, of course. Statistics show that
104 million American adults had access to the Internet as of the
second half of 2000, a number that continues to increase. 2
Moreover, the effect of the Internet on law practice has been farreaching over the last five years, although the profession has yet
to adapt itself fully to cyberspace. I hope today to highlight one
area where the traditional approaches of the legal profession
have begun to conflict with the changes wrought by the Internet,
and to suggest what the future might hold.
I want to focus on legal advice in cyberspace. Legal advice is
dispensed in cyberspace every day. It is dispensed by lawyers
and by non-lawyers. It is dispensed for free and for a fee. Some
of it is good advice, and a great deal of it, I suspect, is bad advice.
I Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. This essay is a revised and
expanded version of remarks delivered at the April 2001 symposium.
2 See Reid Kanaley, In Search of the Meaningof(Online) Lie, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar.
22, 2001); see also Amy Harmon & Felicity Barringer, Investors May Have Repudiated
the Internet, but Consumers Have Not, N.Y. TIMES, at C2 (July 22, 2002) (reporting
recent Pew survey that 66 million people use Internet daily; 11 million Americans said
Internet assisted in choosing school or college; 8 million said Internet use helped them
through a job transition; and 8 million used Internet to find apartments or homes).
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The question that our profession must grapple with today is how
to respond to the proliferation of this activity on the Internet. In
particular, the legal profession must decide whether it will
embrace the new technology, or whether it instead will regulate
much of the innovative potential of this technology out of
existence.
Although my track record as a prognosticator may be
somewhat suspect, I want to make a few observations at the
outset about how lawyers might be expected to approach the
regulation of legal advice giving in cyberspace. First, the legal
profession's track record with respect to technological innovation
is less than encouraging. Lawyers as a group generally have
been fairly technophobic.
This fact sometimes comes as a
surprise to those whose work focuses on cyberspace, because they
tend by nature to be the first kids on the block to get the latest
laptop or the newest version of the Palm Pilot. Law students also
may find the concept of technophobia to be alien to their own
experience, because this generation has grown up with VCR's,
Game Boys, Nintendo, Email, and cell phones. In general,
however, although it might be an overstatement to suggest that
attorneys are all Luddites, it is fair to say that lawyers are not
early adopters of technology. Lawyers by training and by
disposition tend to be conservative, risk averse, and cautious
about change.
My own research on the history of lawyer
technophobia has shown that lawyers resisted technology even as
early as the introduction of the telephone at the turn of the
twentieth century. 3 I think it is likely that the first skirmishes
over legal advice giving in cyberspace will reflect, at least in part,
this technophobia. 4
The second factor is the contrast between the pervasive
regulation of the legal profession and the relatively unfettered
world of cyberspace. Lawyers are subject to a variety of different
regulatory constraints, including the ethical rules of their own
states, a number of bodies of substantive law, and the
unauthorized practice of law statutes. Attempting to take this
3 I have discussed this issue in greater detail in Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Clent
Relationshipsin Cyberspace: The Periland the Promise,49 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999).
4 This is particularly likely because the generation that today provides much of the
leadership for the legal profession - the senior partners, the judges, and the bar regulators
B may generally have had less experience with the Internet than those who have grown
up with computer technology at their fingertips.
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vast and somewhat inconsistent body of law and to apply it to
legal advice giving on the Internet may prove to be a daunting
task. Moreover, there are important constitutional concerns,
particularly with respect to the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech, that necessarily will be implicated by any
attempt to regulate legal advice in cyberspace. Confronting the
changes in legal services that have recently emerged may
necessitate adapting the existing law in ways that few would
have anticipated just a few years ago.
Third, lawyers as a group are likely to be self-protective if they
view certain cyberspace activity as a threat to their economic
viability or their status as a learned profession. Lawyers have
been assiduous over the years in using the unauthorized practice
of law statutes to protect against perceived incursions by real
estate agents, bankers, insurance adjusters, and other groups
that seemed to be providing something that could be
characterized as legal advice. Lawyers are likely to be equally
concerned about the future of their profession if the proliferation
of legal advice in cyberspace appears to pose such a threat.
I hasten to add that I do not expect the legal profession to
attempt to exterminate all legal activity in cyberspace, nor do I
anticipate that lawyers will return to the days of parchment
paper and quill pens. Even if they wanted to do so, which is
unlikely, lawyers would find it impossible to turn the clock back
to 1993, when almost no one had heard of the Internet. Indeed,
the Internet has already irrevocably altered the way lawyers do
business, and the increased use of cyberspace is likely to
generate major changes in how legal advice is given in the future.
Nevertheless, these changes are unlikely to occur without
struggle, if not litigation, over how to define the practice of law in
the twenty-first century.
Against this backdrop, let us turn to the question of legal
advice giving in cyberspace. How is legal advice being provided
on-line today?Lawyers provide legal advice on-line through a
variety of vehicles. Some lawyers have individual web sites in
which they offer, for a fee, short answers to legal questions
emailed to them. Others provide such limited assistance without
a fee. There are also web sites operated by non-lawyers that
invite lay people to submit legal questions and invite lawyers to
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respond to them. 5 Non-lawyers are also providing legal advice on
the Internet, although they characterize their service as
providing "legal information" in order to avoid admitting that
they are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 6 This
occurs largely through newsgroups and websites where nonlawyers purport to assist other lay people with their legal
problems. In addition, many websites now offer personalized
legal document preparation, for a fee, in which they prepare
simple wills, divorce papers, and other documents.
The regulatory issues created by legal advice giving online
differ, depending on whether the person giving the legal advice is
a lawyer or a layperson. I first want to address the question of
lawyers who give specific legal advice to lay people over the
Internet. The danger from that activity is that one of those
strangers will be harmed by relying on the advice, and seek
recourse either through a civil suit or by filing a complaint
against the lawyer with the bar.7 Although no court to date has
ruled on this issue, lawyers must be aware that the act of giving
specific legal advice to a layperson, under circumstances in which
it would be reasonable for that person to rely on it, may create an
attorney-client relationship, with all the professional obligations
inherent in that relationship.
Consider for a moment how the law has traditionally
addressed the creation of an attorney-client relationship. The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers outlines the
principles governing the formation of the attorney-client
relationship as follows:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when (1) a person
manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the
lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (b) the
lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the service. 8
5 See e.g., mycounsel.com which allows employers to give employees access and have
their legal questions answered.
6 See
e.g.,
www.ask-a-lawyer.com;
forum.freeadvice.com;
lawguru.com;
prairielaw.com.
7 See generallyLanctot, supra note 3, at 168-84 (discussing legal basis for formation
of attorney client relationship).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (Lexis 2002)
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In cyberspace, a layperson may manifest this intent through
email, by expressly asking for legal advice or for assistance in
carrying out a particular objective.
Although some might
consider this contact to be insufficient, keep in mind that an
attorney-client relationship can be created without a written
agreement and without a fee. 9 Moreover, courts are willing to
construe these requirements broadly, to protect lay people who
reasonably believed a lawyer was representing them.lOEven
though posting a request for legal advice on the Internet differs
in many ways from an office visit, the courts have at times found
a viable request for legal services even when the interchange
between lawyer and client was brief, or when the lawyer and
putative client never met in person.
If we apply the Restatement model to an email exchange
between a lawyer and a lay person, we see that the lawyer's act
of responding to that request with specific legal advice can
constitute consent to provide legal services, and thereby create
an attorney-client relationship. As comment e to section 14 of
the Restatement explains: "The lawyer may explicitly agree to
represent the client, or may indicate consent by action, for
example by performing services requested by the client."l In an
on-line exchange, for instance, a lawyer could explicitly consent
to represent the putative client by posting a response or by
sending an individual E-mail directly to the questioner that says:
"I will represent you in this matter." Indeed, even giving legal
advice in less formal situations, such as when a lawyer agrees to
advise a pro se litigant, may suffice to create professional
obligations. 12
To create an attorney-client relationship, however, the lawyer's
advice must be specific to the facts of the putative client's case.
(outlining when an attorney-client relationship arises).
9 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.
1978) (stating that existence of attorney-client "relationship is not dependent upon the
payment of fees nor,... upon the execution of a formal contract"), rev'd sub nom.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221.
10 See Togstad v. Vesely Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695 (1980) (upholding
jury finding of attorney malpractice).
II RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt e (Lexis 2002)
(discussing necessity of attorney consent before attorney-client relationship arises).
12 See, e.g., Seeley v. Seeley, 514 N.Y.S. 2d 110, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (asserting
"fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary
consultation by a prospective client with a view toward retention of the lawyer, although
actual employment does not result.").
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Giving specific legal advice in response to a set of particular facts
is the hallmark of the practice of law, while offering general
information about the law is not. It is reasonable for a putative
client to rely on advice that is specifically tailored to his
particular request, and the courts are clear that it is the
reasonable belief of the client that will govern.' 3 The nature of
the communication could give the lawyer either actual or
constructive knowledge that the questioner intends to rely on the
advice or is otherwise depending on the lawyer to protect his or
Such a situation would meet the
her legal interests.
and could thereby result in
Restatement,
of
the
requirements
liability for an unwary cyberspace lawyer.
The implications of finding an attorney-client relationship in
these Internet communications are substantial. Lawyers who
provide specific advice to on-line questioners may now owe duties
of loyalty, confidentiality, competency, and zealous advocacy to
those clients. They may be subject to liability for malpractice if
their advice proves to be negligent. They may themselves run
afoul of restrictions against unauthorized practice of law if they
advise on-line clients in jurisdictions other than those in which
the lawyers are licensed to practice. Thus, the proliferation of
advice giving in cyberspace by lawyers raises a substantial
regulatory concern.
The solution many lawyers seem to favor is the inclusion of a
blanket disclaimer on their websites. But, as I have argued
elsewhere, this is more placebo than panacea.14 Neither courts
nor bar counsel are likely to be sympathetic to lawyers who have
given negligent advice and then try to rely on boilerplate
disclaimers to absolve them of responsibility for harm. The
courts have been especially protective of lay people when lawyers
attempt to enforce contracts against them, and this view is likely
to apply with particular force in cyberspace transactions. In
addition, once the lawyer gives specific legal advice to someone
who asked for it, it is unpersuasive to suggest that the person
was unreasonable to rely on it. At some point, the conduct of the
13 See, e.g., Keoseian v. Von Kaulbach, 707 F. Supp. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(highlighting that courts developed fairly broad test for determining whether attorneyclient relationship has formed, rejecting any arguments that indicia of formal relationship
are necessary).
14 See generallyLanctot, supra note 3, at 186 (discussing in detail use of disclaimers
on attorney websites).
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lawyer would be so inconsistent with the disclaimer of a
professional relationship that the disclaimer would be treated as
ineffective. A variety of court cases and bar opinions supports
the common-sense notion that an attorney-client relationship,
once created, cannot be disclaimed away.
Despite attorney dependence on elaborate written disclaimers,
courts may well find it reasonable for lay people to treat such
disclaimers as nothing more than "legalese," particularly if the
conduct of the attorney is inconsistent with the disclaimer. Even
under principles that permit limiting the scope or objective of the
representation, there are problems with blanket disclaimers,
because there are core attributes of the attorney-client
relationship, such as basic competency, that cannot be bargained
away.
Indeed, there are inherent difficulties in crafting a
disclaimer that will adequately disclose all duties that are owed
and then disclaimed. In short, whether or not a lawyer will be
able to rely on a disclaimer will hinge on the nature of the
request for advice, the conduct of the lawyer in response to the
request, and the factual circumstances surrounding the
disclaimer. In my view, if the legal advice given is specifically
tailored to the factual circumstances presented, that conduct will
suffice to create an attorney-client relationship, regardless of
what boilerplate disclaimers the lawyer attaches to the advice.
Recent bar opinions that have addressed the phenomenon of
lawyers giving advice in cyberspace have taken this same
approach. They have suggested that lawyers who give specific
legal advice to questioners run the risk of creating an attorneyclient relationship, whether or not that was their actual intent. 15
15 The most recent such opinion is from the New Mexico State Bar which followed the
approach of other bar opinions in advising that "an attorney-client relationship is
probably created when a lawyer responds to specific questions from users on the
Internet." NM Adv. Op. 2001-1, reported at 70 U.S.L.W. 2187 (Oct. 2, 2001). Other
jurisdictions have also addressed this question in recent years. See, e.g., SC Adv. Op. 9427 reported at 2002 WL 1401578 (S.C.Bar.Eth.Adv.Comm.) (permitting on-line legal
discussions "solely for the purpose of discussing legal topics generally, without giving of
advice or representation of any particular client"); OR Eth. Op. 1994-137 reported at
1994 WL 455098 (Or.St.Bar.Assn.) (permitting development of on-line legal data base
that would furnish information to inquiries, but would not be staffed by a live person,
noting: "if someone at the legal information service were generating legal advice during
an on-line session by giving personal advice, that is the practice of law."); AZ Jud. Adv.
Op. 95-17 (recommending that lawyers should "probably not" answer questions raised in
chat rooms on-line because of the inability to check for potential conflicts of interest and
the risk of disclosing confidential information, and noting: "Ethically, it would follow that
lawyers should not answer specific legal questions from lay people through the Internet
unless the question presented is of a general nature and the advice given is not fact-
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Indeed, courts and bar opinions historically have drawn a
distinction between giving general legal information, which has
generally been permitted, and giving specific legal advice tailored
to an individual's particular problems, which has been largely
prohibited even if a disclaimer was given. This has been true
with respect to legal advice given on radio talk shows, in
newspaper columns, books, seminars, and through 900-number
telephone lines.16 The reason for this is that the act of giving
legal advice in response to a particularized inquiry is at the heart
of the practice of law.
The fact that there is potential liability for giving casual,
negligent, or erroneous legal advice on-line seems to me to be
appropriate, rather than problematic. In my view, lawyers
should always be cautious when giving legal advice, whether it is
generic legal information or the type of specific legal advice that
could trigger an attorney-client relationship. It benefits neither
the image of the legal profession nor the lay people who need
legal services to insulate lawyers from the consequences of
carelessness when they give advice. In fact, the focus on
disclaimers as a method of avoiding incurring obligations to lay
people really begs the question about whether we as a profession
ought to revisit the definition of the attorney-client relationship
in light of the changes in communication that have been
facilitated by the Internet.
One solution that has been recommended is to permit lawyers
to limit the scope of representation by "unbundling" various legal
duties from the traditional, full-service model of the attorneyclient relationship.17 The idea of "discrete task representation"
or "unbundled legal services" has been proposed as a possible
specific."); IL Adv. Op. 96-10 ("lawyers participating in chat-groups or other on-line
services that could involve offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be
connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advice are the
lawyer's clients, with the benefits and burdens of that relationship."); Phila. Eth. Op. 98-6
reported at 1998 WL 112691 (Phila.Bar.Assn.Prof.Guid.Comm.) (lawyer in on-line
discussion group must be cautious about not creating, albeit inadvertently, an attorneyclient relationship, which begins "when a person would have a reasonable expectation
that such a relationship was formed."); NY Eth. Op. 709 reported at 1998 WL 957924
(N.Y.St.Bar.Assn.Comm.Prof.Eth.) (in discussing proposed Internet legal practice, "a
conflicts check is not required where the attorney's interaction is limited to providing
general information of an educational nature, no confidential information is obtained from
a client and no specific advice tailored to a client's particular circumstances is rendered.").
16 See generallyLanctot, supra note 3, at 218-44.
17 I have discussed this in greater detail at Lanctot, supranote 3, at 253-58.
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remedy to the national problem of unmet legal needs. The model
is that of a menu of legal tasks from which the client selects, in
consultation with the lawyer. Under this model, the client
purchases only the services that he or she needs and can afford,
and the lawyer does not incur the full obligations inherent in a
traditional attorney-client relationship. The act of giving specific
legal advice to clients on-line, while expressly disclaiming any
additional responsibilities, is at least theoretically a cyberspace
version of discrete task representation.
Unbundling, however, is not a cost-free solution. There are
real risks to the lay public from establishing a type of
professional relationship that may not provide them with the
legal protection they need, particularly if that relationship is
structured to insulate the lawyer against all malpractice liability.
In addition, there is the obvious danger of creating a two-tiered
model of legal services: full-service for the rich and cut-rate for
the not so rich. Nevertheless, the idea of limited representation
may be one for the organized bar to explore further, as legal
advice in cyberspace becomes more prevalent. In fact, in August
2001, the American Bar Association gave preliminary approval to
a recommended change in Model Rule 1.2 that would more
explicitly recognize a form of limited representation. Model Rule
1.2(c) would read as follows: "A lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent." 18
The proposed Comment to Model Rule 1.2(c) explains, in part:
Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial
latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be
reasonable under the circumstances.
If, for example, a
client's objective is limited to securing general information
about the law the client needs in order to handle a common
and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and
client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to
a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however,
would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not
sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely.
Although an agreement for a limited representation does not
18 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Proposed Rule 1.2 (c) available at http:
www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel2.html
(discussing
limitations
of
attorney-client
relationship subject to informed consent).
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exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent
representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered
when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
See Rule 1.1.19
Comment 8 to the proposed rule further notes that an
agreement to limit representation "must accord with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and other law," citing specifically Model
Rule 1.1, which requires competent representation, Model Rule
1.8, which governs a variety of prohibited transactions, and
Model Rule 5.6, which prohibits restrictions on the lawyer's right
to practice law.
How would this rule, if broadly adopted by the states, affect
advice giving by lawyers in cyberspace? One might argue that
this rule simply recognizes a longstanding concept of limited
representation under certain circumstances, and that the rule
does not work any substantial change in the traditional
understanding of the attorney-client relationship. On the other
hand, the requirement in the amended rule that the limitation on
representation be "reasonable" and a product of "informed
consent" could have a significant effect on the use of disclaimers.
Over-reliance on boilerplate disclaimers
could well be
inconsistent with the concept of informed consent. Moreover, a
lawyer who purported to give a short email response to a complex
Email question, without providing additional assistance, could
run afoul of the requirement that limits on representation be
"reasonable." It bears noting that the Comment to the amended
Model Rule expressly reiterates that certain core aspects of the
attorney-client relationship, such as competency, may not be
bargained away.
To conclude my thoughts on regulating legal advice by lawyers
in cyberspace, I think it is a good sign that the legal profession
finally has begun to focus on this phenomenon. The emergence of
bar opinions addressing cyberspace issues, the renewed interest
in unbundling legal services, and the proposed amendment to
Model Rule 1.2 are the initial steps toward reconciling the
traditional requirements of the attorney-client relationship with
19 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Proposed Rule 1.2 (c) cmt. 7 avaiable at
http: www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel2.html
(noting necessity of reasonableness for any
limitations on attorney-client relationship).
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changes in technology. Whether we will need to rethink the
entire professional model in light of the emerging technology is a
question that continues to linger as we consider other aspects of
cyberspace that have begun to challenge the traditions of the
legal profession.
Let me turn now to the other side of the equation-legal advice
given by lay people in cyberspace. The question of whether
certain activities on the Internet by non-lawyers constitute the
unauthorized practice of law is likely to become the focus of
future regulatory efforts. One area of particular concern today is
the emergence of websites that sell personalized legal documents
to lay people. The lay entrepreneurs who operate these sites
hope to garner a portion of the market for legal services that
traditionally has been underserved by the organized bar. One
site that has received a great deal of attention in legal technology
circles is the British website called Desktoplawyer.com ("Desktop
Lawyer"), which markets a service it calls "Rapidocs," a method
of rapidly preparing legal documents on-line. Consumers are
invited to order personalized legal documents in a wide array of
areas, including divorce, wills, powers of attorney, and sales of
goods. 20 Similar services are available for American consumers
as well. Advocates of these websites prefer to characterize them
as providing "legal information," or simply as serving as glorified
typing services.
The legal question is deceptively simple. Does filling out a
legal form for someone else constitute "legal advice" and
therefore the unauthorized practice of law? The answer to that
question is not readily apparent, and the implications of how we
answer that question may be profound. Beneath the legal issues
is a fundamental policy question about whether the legal
profession ought to prevent these websites from providing basic
wills and other personalized legal documents to consumers, or
whether we should instead see this use of the technology as an
opportunity to serve the needs of many lower and middle-class
people.
One difficulty in determining whether a particular lay activity
impermissibly intrudes into the sphere reserved for lawyers is
defining what constitutes the practice of law. Our profession may
20 See www.desktoplawyer.net.
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be quite adept at giving legal advice, but it has never been very
good at defining it. The 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly noted the difficulty of giving a
comprehensive definition of the practice of law, but gave the
following explanation:
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of
services for others that call for the professional judgment of a
lawyer. The essence of the professionaljudgment of the
lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy oflaw to a specific legalproblem of a client .... 21
(Emphasis added).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct did not even attempt
this much of a definition, stating the obvious: "The definition of
the practice of law is established by law and varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons."22 (Emphasis
added). Of course, having a vague definition for the practice of
law has had its benefits. It has given the legal profession a great
deal of flexibility to ward off any incursions by potential economic
competitors, such as real estate agents, bankers, accountants,
and insurance adjusters. On the other hand, the ambiguity of
the definition may make it difficult to enforce against innovative
uses of technology.
Although there is little evidence that the availability of these
personalized online document services has yet penetrated the
market to any significant extent, it is likely that, in the near
future, we will need to consider whether these automated
systems for preparing legal documents pose regulatory concerns.
I think the profession will have to think seriously about three
questions. First, is such activity the "practice of law" under
existing precedent? Second, assuming such activity would meet
that definition, would application of state laws to such activity
pass constitutional muster? Third, even assuming that the
activities of these legal information providers could be legally
and constitutionally regulated, as a matter of social policy,

21 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 3-5 (Lexis 2002).
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt 1 (Lexis 2002).
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should the organized bar seek to regulate this activity at all?23
As to the first question, the courts have consistently taken the
position that selecting which form to use, giving advice about
which information ought to be included in a form, or soliciting
information from a layperson and then making determinations
about how to use the information in the form is the equivalent of
practicing law. On the other hand, merely serving as a scrivener
is not. Indeed, the distinction that courts and bar opinions have
drawn with respect to the creation of attorney-client
relationships-the difference between general legal information
and specific legal advice-is the same one used to define whether
a layperson is practicing law.
Although I cannot predict with any degree of certainty how the
courts would react to an unauthorized practice of law claim
brought against an on-line document preparer, one recent case
provides insight on this issue. In Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee v. Parsons Technology, 24 a federal district court held
that the sale of the CD-ROM "Quicken Family Lawyer" in Texas
violated the state's unauthorized practice of law statute. The
CD-ROM enabled consumers to prepare their own wills or other
simple legal documents by using the forms and instructions
provided. Judge Barefoot Sanders concluded that the software
"purports to select" the appropriate legal document, "customizes
the documents," and "creates an air of reliability about the
documents, which increases the likelihood that an individual
user will be misled into relying on them."25 The fact that the
product also contained a disclaimer had little influence on the
district court. The district court's order, which barred sale of
Quicken Family Lawyer in Texas, sparked immediate
controversy, 26 and a vigorous lobbying campaign persuaded the
Texas State Legislature to amend its unauthorized practice of
23 I discuss these issues in greater detail in, Catherine Lanctot, What Needs Fixing?:
Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparationand the UnauthorizedPractice
of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 826-30 (2002).
24 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated by 179 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1999).
25 Id. at 18 (noting that based on Texas statute interpretations, this website fell
within range of conduct Texas courts determined unauthorized practice of law).
26 See, e.g., Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers, $15.95 A Box, NAT'L L.J. at A18 (Feb. 22,
1999) (asserting dangers of this practice such as conflict of interest with existing clients;
different jurisdictional laws; and inadvertent attorney liability by forming attorney-client
relationship).
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law statute to permit software like Quicken Family Lawyer. 27 In
response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court's opinion in Parsons. 2 8
I expect more cases like Parsons to emerge as consumers avail
themselves of the new technology to avoid the need to resort to
lawyers to obtain basic legal documents. Moreover, the fact that
the Texas legislature felt it necessary to amend its unauthorized
practice of law statute to insulate Parsons from liability suggests
that similar statutes in other states could be applied to websites
that produce legal documents. In my view, there is ample case
law to support the proposition that a layperson that is paid to
assist another in making decisions about how to prepare a legal
document is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Thus,
as to the first question I posed, I believe that if bar regulators
wanted to, they could use existing statutes and case law to
pursue online document providers for engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Having said that, however, I hasten to add that the answer to
the second question, whether applying such precedent to online
activity would be constitutional, is far less clear. The First
Amendment has been raised repeatedly in defense of the rights of
lay people to provide legal information to others, with some
success.
Such a constitutional argument was raised in the
District court proceedings of the Parsons case, and was
unsuccessful, although the court admitted that the question was
close. 29 I agree that the question is close, but I think it is quite
possible that aggressive enforcement of the unauthorized practice
of law statutes against online document preparers could run into
serious constitutional problems. Resolution of the issue will
hinge largely on the distinction between general legal
information or opinions about the law, which presumably is
27 As ultimately adopted, the amendment to sec. 81.101 read as follows: "the 'practice
of law' does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale...
lofl computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state
that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney." H.B. 1507, 76th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
28 Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Tech. Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1999) (remanding case in light of amended Texas law's new definition of "practice of
law").
29 Parsons,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813 , at *29 ("While the Court recognizes that the
issue is close, it is of the opinion that the Statute does not 'substantially burden' more
speech than necessary. .. ").
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protected by the First Amendment, and specific legal advice
tailored to a unique set of facts, which presumably is not.
The bar presumably would contend that selling particularized
legal documents to lay people either could be regulated
constitutionally as conduct rather than speech, or because such
regulation would not be targeted at the content of the speech but
rather at the harms to consumers from unlicensed entrepreneurs
purporting to provide legal advice. One difficulty that is likely to
emerge, however, is that statutes that suppress some free speech
ordinarily must be tailored to be no more burdensome than
necessary. Here, the historic inability of the bar to define the
practice of law may prove to be an insurmountable weakness.
Enforcing an unauthorized practice of law statute against an
online legal document provider could be difficult if the scope of
what constitutes a violation of that statute cannot adequately be
defined. These constitutional questions plainly merit additional
study and debate, but they may pose substantial barriers to any
enforcement efforts brought against advice-givers in cyberspace.
The third question, then, is this: Even assuming that these
websites could be suppressed by aggressive enforcement of the
unauthorized practice of law statutes, and that those statutes
could withstand constitutional attack, should the organized bar
pursue such an enforcement strategy? I do not pretend to know
the answer to this question, although I believe it merits far more
debate than has been heard to date. I worry about the prospect
of an unregulated new industry marketing what are clearly legal
services to unsuspecting lay consumers. There are real consumer
protection issues that we cannot simply ignore by terming all bar
attempts to regulate unauthorized practice of law as nothing but
economic protectionism. The information given may be false or
misleading. The forms may be outdated or not suitable for use
for a particular set of facts. There is no follow-up to ensure that
the appropriate documents were used, or whether additional
assistance was necessary. Consumers themselves may be misled
into thinking that they have resolved their legal difficulties
without realizing that the documents they have paid for are
woefully incomplete. Finally, we have no way of knowing how
courts will react five or ten years from now, when the first
dot.com wills are probated and turn out to have been inadequate.
For these reasons, I believe it is essential for us as a profession to
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think seriously about how we are going to address the
proliferation of these services.
On the other hand, I often wonder whether we have brought
this issue on ourselves by neglecting to provide legal services to
large segments of the population. My experience in discussing
this issue with lay entrepreneurs who provide legal information
on the Internet has been somewhat troubling. Some non-lawyers
have openly announced their intent to put many lawyers out of
business,
particularly
solo
practitioners,
by providing
uncomplicated legal services more quickly and more cheaply than
lawyers do.
Much of this hubris came before the dotcom
slowdown of the last year, but I think the mentality remains the
same. The persistent theme of those who advocate such a broad
change in the delivery of legal services is that the legal profession
has essentially abdicated its responsibility to meet the basic legal
needs of ordinary people at an affordable rate, and thus has left
an unserved market ripe for the picking. These advocates
further argue, with some historical justification, that the legal
profession's insistence on labeling all kinds of routine activities to
be the "practice of law" has been nothing but economic
protectionism.
The mantra for these advocates has been
"empowering consumers" to represent themselves.
Although these critics of the legal profession make some valid
points, I continue to question the underlying premise of their
argument.
The suggestion that the average middle class
consumer would be better off representing himself, or herself, in
simple legal matters is, in my view, simply wrong. The medical
profession also had been pressed in recent years to facilitate
patient autonomy, but this has not meant a move to enabling the
average layperson to remove his own appendix in the privacy of
his own home. Self-representation is hardly an unqualified good,
and representation by competent lawyers is hardly an
unqualified evil.
It seems illogical to suggest that the
appropriate societal response to the unmet legal needs of millions
of Americans is to tell them to represent themselves. The fact of
the matter is that legal principles are often opaque, and factual
scenarios often complex, and that using boilerplate legal
documents as a one-size-fits-all response to common legal
problems is hardly an effective solution to the unmet legal needs
of most consumers.
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The phenomenon of lay advice giving in cyberspace is only the
tip of the iceberg. The larger problem, as we well know, is the
ongoing inability of the legal profession to serve the needs of
millions of lower income and middle income consumers, who
cannot afford the legal services they require. The solution to that
problem is not for the legal profession simply to abdicate any
responsibility for those needs, and to relegate those people to
legal self-help or to purchase boilerplate forms from on-line
providers. At a minimum, we ought to consider whether other
options short of deregulating the market for basic legal services
would be more effective for those consumers, and more protective
of their rights and interests.
This overview of how legal advice is being given in cyberspace
demonstrates how the emergence of new technology may force
the legal profession to reevaluate its function in the twenty-first
century. The questions that emerge from this phenomenon go to
the very heart of what we do as a profession. In particular, we
need to think about what we offer to lay people, and whether the
services that traditionally had been performed by lawyers in the
past will continue to be performed by lawyers in the future. We
will have to explain what it is lawyers offer that cannot be
offered faster and more cheaply by lay people. We may be called
upon to define the core of what we do.
We are not mere legal content providers. We bring our
educated and informed judgment to bear on a set of complex
facts. We do so while offering the recipient of that legal advice
the promise of loyalty, confidentiality, competency, and
unswerving devotion to his or her lawful objectives. It is that
role that lawyers have served in the past, and the one that
lawyers will continue to serve, even in the brave new world of
cyberspace.

